Academic References for Carbon Accounts

From EcoCounts Wiki
Jump to navigation Jump to search

The Commons are not a Tragedy

For Citizens, Business and Government

The triangle of inertia - everyone blames each other, nobody does anything.

To create a World with a Stable Climate

  1. give everyone a fair share of fossil fuels in decreasing amounts
  2. start shutting off the fossil fuel taps
  3. ensure climate justice within and between countries
  4. create a carbon price for business based on the people's allowance, to drive innovation for the energy transition

Mission

  • Demonstrate that living within a carbon budget is a liveable lifestyle - EcoCounts
  • Develop and advocate our economic climate policy - a carbon price based on carbon allowances - carbon accounts for every person and every business
  • Build a new public narrative around the fight for the climate
  • Fundraise for EcoCounts, policy development and campaigning

EcoCounts - be more sustainable and still live well

One page intro

  • Weight Watchers for the climate: counting our emissions and recording our progress
  • Working as a group, communicating and collaborating to make more progress together
  • Creating an app & database to make emissions tracking easy
  • Teaming up with local businesses and councils to create carbon labels and local low carbon services
  • First group is based in North London, creating a blueprint to implement anywhere

Economics - one fell swoop

One page

  • building a framework with appropriate climate policies - the right policy in the right place
  • carbon allowances, fair per capita CO2 emissions tokens
  • personal carbon trading
  • national carbon currency
  • a carbon price
  • a robust, transparent carbon accounting framework for business and industry and the carbon markets
  • carbon drawdown rewarded from the national carbon currency supply
  • climate justice nationally and globally

Building a new narrative

One page

  • People will take action when they know the government is behind them.
  • People will take action when they know business and industry is pulling in the same direction.
  • People will take action when they see other people doing so.
  • People will take action when they sense it is fair and equitable.
  • People will take action when they are offered a clear solution that is affordable and effective.
  • People will take action when there is a clear narrative with no opposing or distracting voices.

Currently in the public's mind, none of these things exist, and meanwhile extreme weather the stimulus to take action grows stronger.

People will only learn about these things when significant effort and resources are put into creating a public narrative around the concept.

We can draw together writers, designers, film-makers and social media experts in collaboration with like-minded NGOs to create a campaign that puts the concept of carbon allowances, fairness and business behaviour change fairly and squarely on the table and into the media, so that academics, economists, policy makers and elected officials take notice.

Business wants a carbon price and clarity in carbon accounting

Existing Climate Policies

Too little, too late.

The dominant political response to anthropogenic global warming rests on policies such as Net Zero 2050, the EU Green Deal and the US$2 trillion Inflation Reduction Act, commensurate with incremental transition spread out over decades[1]. However evidence is appearing that many of the assumptions are over-optimistic, for instance, climate change is accelerating faster than predicted???, reduction in CO2 emissions is not occurring???, nature-based solutions are limited in the amount of CO2 that can be drawn down[2][3] and are themselves vulnerable to climate change impacts[4][5], while technological solutions are essentially unproven[6][7] and probably exceptionally expensive[8]. Statistical analysis of the probabilities around different low-carbon socio-economic scenarios[9], most of which rely heavily on nature-based solutions and carbon dioxide removal to allow slower global emissions reduction, shows that by far the most rational approach in policy making would be ambitious, robust and equitable climate action, based on significantly greater near-term action in this decade, with corresponding transitional challenges. We propose an economically feasible and politically plausible emissions mitigation policy to meet that challenge.

In the 30 years since the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, many decarbonisation policies have been enacted and many more proposed in an attempt to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The significant policies include:

  • carbon taxes, e.g. on the sale of gasoline, with the aim to generate funds to support the transition to renewable energy
  • carbon taxes, with the aim to reduce demand for fossil fuels and lower CO2 emissions
  • subsidies for low emissions alternatives to high emissions products, e.g. electric motorised transport
  • investment in low carbon technological innovation and infrastructure, e.g. renewable energy, alternative fuels, power grids
  • subsidies, aid and grants for nature-based carbon drawdown projects, e.g. REDD+
  • information provision, education and the stimulation of self-limiting behaviours by citizens, e.g. reducing own carbon footprints
  • regulation via decarbonisation targets imposed on corporations or sectors e.g. California auto industry EV : ICE ratios or capacity of coal power stations
  • rationing of fossil fuel sales at retail level
  • emissions quotas at national level, e.g. UK CCC carbon budgets[10], GCI Contraction & Convergence[11]
  • emissions quotas at industry level, e.g. emissions trading schemes
  • emissions quotas at citizen level, e.g. TEQs (tradable energy quotas)[12], PCT (personal carbon trading)[13]
  • exchange-based carbon pricing, e.g. auction-driven emissions trading schemes
  • government-led carbon pricing, e.g. accounting for the social cost of carbon in government budgeting
  • central bank-based carbon pricing, e.g. Global Carbon Reward[14]
  • carbon offsetting

Carbon taxes are a much promoted solution but criticised variously for their ineffectiveness due to poor price signaling, their inequitability, their impermanence, their impact on GDP, and for inadequately protecting vulnerable communities that suffer the greatest environmental harms from the extraction, processing, and burning of fossil fuels. A variation combined with social dividends demonstrates that it can be equitable and have no impact on GDP[15]. Multiple examples of regional or national carbon taxes exist, where some reductions in CO2 emissions have been achieved[16][17], but experience, e.g. from the Canadian province of British Columbia[18], from the US state of California[19], and from Australia[20] shows the policy's susceptibility to political difficulty, social inequality and ineffective implementation. Some resulting emissions reductions have been statistically significant over the long term, but none are sufficient to be effective in the context of the time constraints posed by climate change. There is simply a lack of evidence that carbon taxes can successfully provide deep reductions in CO2 emissions[21], or address the social inequality issues[22], even when purposefully designed to do so[23].

Emissions trading schemes are also criticised for having regressive effects on low‐income groups and impacting industrial competitiveness[24] and have a clear history of being vulnerable to political and business interests[25] or the inexactitudes of carbon offsetting allowed[26] and there is doubt that these issues can be overcome in future[27][28]. A recent review of carbon pricing in the literature found that there were only limited advantages to be gained from carbon pricing policies[29], and that it did not lend itself to the challenge of full decarbonisation of the economy.

The purpose and key economic impact of carbon tax or industry emissions trading policies focuses on demand for high emissions fuel. The policies cause carbon-intense products to increase in price, which drives down demand and thus reduces CO2 emissions. However this reduction cannot be precisely quantified, it can only modelled beforehand based on a chosen target and hence the actual effected reduction is not guaranteed. One can only revisit the model after the fact to help determine the model parameters for the next period. The second problem is that bad actors are able to stimulate demand, or at least hinder the decrease in demand, via advertising, marketing, public relations and outright disinformation campaigns which affect consumer habits and political policy[30][31]. A more effective policy which could better guarantee the planned reduction in emissions would be a policy controlling fossil fuel supply.

The Global Carbon Reward policy is designed to stimulate renewable energy investment, the development of low emissions industry and the drawdown of atmospheric CO2 via payment of a carbon currency "reward", managed by central banks, which make appropriate payments of the carbon currency to qualifying operations or communities. The carbon currency can be traded freely on foreign exchange markets, subject to a base price. Participating industries, communities and other operations would be attracted by the continually rising value of the currency caused by central bank intervention in the currency markets in the carbon currency's favour. As with carbon taxes or emissions trading policies, the Global Carbon Reward doesn't seek to control fossil fuel supply or make any claim to guarantee planned emissions reductions.

Of all the policy options, direct regulatory intervention in private sector business activities allows direct targeting of big emitters with specific goals, e.g. to force the US power sector to either abandon coal or implement carbon capture technology through setting a specific CO2 emissions ceiling per megawatt of power produced[32]. But while controlling particular CO2 emitters might be readily politically achievable, there will be considerable numbers of other CO2 emitters and emissions types that the regulatory approaches fail to address.

What advantages to a nation would such a framework bring that could be more favourable than a carbon tax, a industry-specific cap-and-trade scheme or a package of regulations? One measure of the efficiency of orthodox carbon pricing, i.e. where climate change-induced damage is to varying extents internalised into the economy via taxes, is the percentage coverage of trade in CO2 emitting industries by a country's carbon tax. As of 2020, this stands at a disturbingly low 16% of all carbon emissions[33] and the uncovered percentage (84% in 2020) is known as the "carbon price gap". Under carbon tax policies, governments are or would be responsible for identifying and bringing CO2-emitting industries under control on a case-by-case basis to close this carbon price gap. Under a carbon currency framework, the implementation would necessarily require a 'Big Bang' approach but would be comprehensive across public and private sector business and industries in a national economy. The "carbon price gap" would drop from an 84% coverage gap in 2020 to near zero at the framework's introduction.

Some economic models show personal carbon trading (PCT) can make major contributions to emissions reductions, reduce household welfare loss and positively influence social equity[34]. Personal Carbon Trading (PCT - the buying and selling of carbon tokens by individuals) has been shown to raise individuals' carbon literacy and to engage people more effectively in efforts to reduce their carbon footprints[35]. This household consumption is directly and indirectly linked to around two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions - a significant emissions reduction opportunity[36].

At the national level, the power of the framework as a social norm[37] and as a social response to worsening climate change-induced economic and social impacts, especially if supported by properly crafted public awareness campaigns[38] is likely to enhance the policy's popularity[39] and effectiveness[40][41]. Having an equal per-capita allocation of carbon tokens, a personal carbon trading framework compares favourably to other CO2 emissions policies in terms of impact on social equity and fairness[42]. TEQs are one popular implementation of a type of carbon rationing that could be leveraged by personal carbon trading. As a rationing system, it would cause direct reduction in fossil fuel supply, and it has some socially equitable elements. It builds on the classic war-time rationing mechanism for fossil fuel, incorporating a mechanism by which it takes on similarities to an industrial emissions trading scheme which allows for involvement of domestic participants. As a type of emissions trading scheme, it also suffers from some of the restrictions and vulnerabilities associated with them, particularly via the sale of TEQs directly to business and industry, which adversely impacts the price signal like a tax and is susceptible to business and political interference. This also removes some agency from citizens, who should be the ones who set the price in the market because they make the most socially useful and market-wide decisions on where emissions should be allowed, whereas businesses will be to a greater or lesser extent restricted by their own business models when seeking out lower emission options.

Economic and Political Missteps

Credible research exists showing how the economic impacts of climate change have been vastly underestimated[43][44][45][46]. The previously universally accepted DICE models of Nordhaus[47], used by the UN IPCC and taken as the highest standard economic research by most national governments, outline how economic cost-benefit analysis provides an optimal target of 4°C of global warming. This conclusion, clearly incompatible with the Paris Agreement targets, is a signal to policy makers that it would take a huge margin of failure on Paris to induce drastic economic consequences. However the DICE model research has been called into question for the omission of the majority of the negative impacts global warming can have on the economy. Climate scientists have commenced reviews of economic climate research, which has never happened under the aegis of the IPCC[48] and they point out how the economic impacts appear extremely low given the extent of the geophysical changes forecast[49]. Many of the assumptions made in the DICE models are criticised as non-credible[43], and the resulting predictions are seen as severe underestimates. Unfortunately action on this issue from policy makers is very slow to appear.

This policy has an obvious advantage in terms of reduced risk of political intervention to weaken its impact. Most climate mitigation policies must be regularly updated by government to adapt to changing circumstances. This requires political action which may not occur. The "Central Carbon Bank" under this policy would be mandated by government to achieve CO2 emissions reduction targets, and would be isolated to a higher degree from political influence in the same way that a nation's central bank is mandated to control inflation and the stability of the economy.

One lesson learned from the COVID-19 pandemic is that the world's more authoritarian governments have generally reacted to the pandemic more successfully[50]. Those governments who have reacted with one eye arguably on their popularity ratings have produced poorer results for their countries. In this context, the more democratic governments in the world could draw a valuable lesson. The seemingly more draconian approach of reducing the supply of CO2-emitting fossil fuels is a more reliable approach when "failure is not an option"[51].

Paradigm-shifting global challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic or global warming call for bold actions, not hesitation. Instituting a second currency might seem to be a drastic course of action, but as Sir David Attenborough said to the UK House of Commons BEIS (Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy) Committee, "we cannot be radical enough in dealing with these issues"[52].

What govt has to do

  • distribute carbon allowances to citizens on per capita basis for spending in the economy
  • impose restrictions on mining or pumping fossil fuels against payment in carbon tokens weight for weight
  • create the monetary framework for carbon tokens to act as a currency, i.e. marketplace, institutions and regulatory requirements

Because business and industry will receive no carbon allowance from the distribution, they must price their goods and services in carbon tokens to acquire the tokens they need to pay for what they buy. This will highlight the flow of fossil fuelled CO2 emissions in the supply chain back in the first instance to the fossil fuel producers.

Historical Precedence

The introduction of a carbon currency based on carbon allowances would not be totally unprecedented. In 1971, the United Kingdom decimalised its currency and dropped the non-decimal shilling[53]. Then in 1973, it introduced VAT[54], and in 1978 started mandating metric measurements[55]. In 1990, the sovereign nations of East and West Germany reunified, completely replacing the Ost-Mark with the Deutsche Mark[56]. In 1999, Germany did it again with 10 other European nations to introduce the Euro[57]. In 2000 at the eve of the millennium, the Y2K bug required simultaneous IT infrastructure roll-outs globally[58].

Manual transactions between customers and retailers or regular business partners could be implemented with relative simplicity, although a dual transaction mechanism would be required where automated payment transactions with both money and carbon tokens occur. The IT infrastructure changes required would be considerable but less than estimated in 2008 by the UK government, as both hardware and software technology has now advanced considerably.

Combining Existing Policies as Components in a Framework

Campaign groups and political parties often advocate for one or other climate policy as a silver bullet to tackle climate change. Research though more and more shows how such policies cannot be successful as stand-alone solutions, and outlines the difficulties in finding the optimal policy mix, advising the simplest combinations if only to facilitate international co-operation on emissions reduction targets and international trade[59]. By utilising facets of several of these policies integrated into one framework based on controlling the supply of fossil fuel products into the economy, we propose a solution that could be effective, feasible and acceptable. By creating a parallel national currency based on carbon tokens allocated to citizens via a national carbon allowance set in tonnes of CO2 emissions, traded by a personal carbon trading scheme, one which incorporates business and industry, and binding levels of fossil fuel production to their allocation, a CO2 emissions reduction framework is developed, which brings social stability, rewards carbon frugality at every level, promotes business and industrial innovation, is resistant to political interference, is internationally replicable, fosters climate justice, and is fundamentally effective at reducing fossil fuel supply and therefore CO2 emissions. The biggest questions regarding the proposed framework are whether policy makers consider the threats from climate change under current policies grave enough to warrant the costs and disruption from the imposition of a parallel currency, and whether there is democratically significant support for a policy that could be viewed as incompatible with libertarian ideals of unregulated free markets.

This proposal combines several components: personal carbon allowances, to bring equitable distribution of ability and responsibility; a Personal Carbon Trading framework, to create a carbon price; a type of Universal Basic Income generated by sale of people's excess carbon allowance, to bring social resilience and easier climate adaptation; a national carbon currency to reveal the carbon price of all goods in the economy; a variation of a Global Carbon Reward, where the national budget of carbon allowances before distribution to citizens is used to fund carbon drawdown projects. Of these policies, UBI as mentioned above has reasonable prospects independently for implementation. Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) is often neglected in policy discussions but a recent review outlines why such neglect is unjustified[60] while another review outlines how the political science multiple streams analysis approach identifies criticism of PCT's set-up and running costs, the lack of clear consensus within the research community on public acceptance of PCT, and lack of clear receptiveness to PCT among politicians[61]. The set-up and running costs pale into insignificance next to the increasingly accepted massive costs of inaction on climate change and the resulting ecological catastrophes[44][62][63]. The lack of clear academic consensus around PCT is due to lack of research but it is now appearing[64][13][39][65][66][67], and receptiveness among politicians, already shown in 2008[68], could be stimulated by public support. Thirdly, a carbon currency will be the greatest policy hurdle for many, but by looking beyond the paradigm of a single currency that currently has hegemony over our economic system[69], one sees that it is key to many of the critical advantages of carbon tokens as outlined above.

Business Impact of Rigour in Carbon Pricing, Accounting and Phasing Out

Scale of Carbon Markets

In 2022, the UK was paying £100 per tonne of CO2 on the ETS for a total £4.3 billion worth of emissions, or 43 Mt of hard-to-abate industrial emissions.[70] When all the UK carbon footprint emissions are covered by the carbon currency and people are paying £100 per tonne to buy and sell tokens, a UK carbon budget of 700 Mt CO2e[71] creates a total carbon token supply worth £70 billion.

Carbon Pricing

Citizens and businesses are able to buy and sell carbon tokens on a central, open market to sell what they don't need or to purchase extra requirement. This creates a national carbon price that reflects the current value of CO2 emissions in the economy. When fewer carbon tokens are handed out as carbon allowances, as the government seeks to reach its emissions target, the carbon price will necessarily rise. As businesses lower their CO2 emissions, they will put lower carbon prices on their goods and services, resulting in citizens having more surplus allowance which they can sell, causing the national carbon price to fall.

https://www.ft.com/content/c17ab330-3803-4629-9e54-2c6a3ed33814

Real-time Carbon Labelling

Carbon price of any product or service is added to incrementally at every step along the supply chain as businesses or traders add their own CO2 emissions to the total

Drives Innovation

If a carbon token currency were introduced, self-interest would make citizens and businesses adept at handling carbon tokens in the same way as money. Just as budgeting income and expenditure of money is key to good financial management, the same would be true for budgeting carbon tokens. For citizens, each would receive a personal allocation at the start of each rationing period and must ensure it is sufficient, or that they have the where-with-all to purchase what they need. Businesses on the other hand would be required to charge and procure all carbon tokens from its customers, which every business would need to manage carefully to cover its carbon token expenditure. From the administrative perspective, business would be compelled to introduce accounting software to account for carbon token income and expenditure.

The carbon currency policy has the effect of increasing citizens' "carbon literacy"[35], i.e. educating every business's innovators. Increasing knowledge of complexities surrounding CO2 emissions in the economy within business, like any relevant knowledge, should have profound effects upon business innovation and technological advances[72]. Since every component or service used in the manufacture of a product or the provision of a service under the carbon token framework would cost a given amount of carbon tokens, that carbon token amount directly represents the absolute carbon price of the item being sold. The information would be clear and the CO2 emissions involved highly visible, bringing several benefits. The concept of hidden 'built-in' emissions would no longer be valid. If all CO2 emissions for an item were not incorporated in its carbon token price, the vendor would have no way of paying the carbon tokens on whatever it consumes to provide the item, except through buying carbon tokens for cash. This inescapable carbon pricing under the carbon token framework, payable by every citizen and business, is more advantageous than the carbon price generated under carbon tax or cap-and-trade policies, where the carbon price signal would become diluted or even lost as a mere component of the cash price. This is significant because people and businesses will be seeking low carbon products more and more as the threats to society from climate change grow. The simple lower cost of an item in a carbon tax regime due to its lower CO2 emissions will go unnoticed in price comparisons against other products or services that were provided more cheaply abroad or of lower quality.

Another corollary of increased carbon literacy would appear within large organisations where the lowest levels within organisations' budgetary hierarchies would take on responsibility for carbon tokens alongside their financial budgets, making prudent decisions on both carbon credit and cash expenditures. Currently the trend is for large organisations, e.g. the UK National Health Service, to model estimates of their total carbon footprints[73]. Because such large scale estimations are inaccurate compared to the exact carbon accounting afforded by carbon tokens under the carbon token regime, decision-making on emissions reduction efforts will not be as effective. In addition, people's greater knowledge of the carbon economy under the carbon token regime would again stimulate more innovative decision-making at these lower levels in the organisational heirarchy in both large corporations and public organisations.

Direct Control over CO2 Emissions

Creation of the primary control mechanism in a pollution reduction framework at the source of the problem, in this case, the fossil fuel producers, is acknowledged to be the key to strong regulatory compliance. This was demonstrated for example by the success of the US Acid Rain SO2 "Cap and Trade" Program[74]. CO2 cap and trade programs have been notably problematic as mentioned above. The key difference between the SO2 cap-and-trade system and the systems for CO2 emissions reduction is that the coal-fired power-stations were the only source of SO2 and therefore easy to regulate. Fossil fuel producers as the only source of fossil fuels and therefore the primary source of CO2 emissions are the most effective target for CO2 emissions reduction regulations.

Comprehensive Coverage of CO2 Emissions in the Economy

No loopholes in coverage nationally or at carbon border e.g. aluminium[75]. Under a national carbon currency, exceptions to the rule and other loopholes would require specific payments in carbon currency from the national government to allow the excepted parties to make purchases with carbon tokens within the new economy. This action to exclude specific actors from the effects of the carbon currency framework would need to be deliberate, otherwise the actor would find itself in full participation. This compares favourably in terms of policy coverage in comparison with any regulatory or carbon tax climate framework where extra action would need to be taken to include actors, whose default legal state would non-participatory.

Because carbon tokens in a national carbon currency require the same security from loss as money, carbon budgets would be tightly controlled in all organisations to avoid unnecessary expenditure, mistakes or criminal actions, creating a level of focus that ensures high levels of CO2 emissions coverage and reduction of the "carbon price gap".

Includes shipping and aviation, traditionally very slow to adapt under business-as-usual [76]

Extends to Other GHG via Licenses Priced in Carbon Currency

Trade Border Facilitation

Governance of Carbon Markets

Transparent, Equitable Payment for Carbon Drawdown

Carbon drawdown from the atmosphere, via ecosystem-based sequestration or direct mechanical processes, comprises a significant part of the emissions- and socio-economic pathways laid out by the IPCC for avoiding the worst effects of climate change.[77] There is a great opportunity for ameliorating climate change, as shown in one review concluding that over 10 Gigatonnes CO2 per year from the atmosphere can be removed by terrestrial natural climate solutions, at affordable costs[2]. However governance of the payment for carbon drawdown is beset by issues of monitoring, reporting and verification, leakage (emissions reductions in one place causing increases in another place), additionality (whether reductions would have happened even without a particular project or program) and permanence (risk of drawn-down CO2 being lost back into the atmosphere) and scale.[78] Currently, such carbon drawdown solutions which sequester large amounts of carbon from the atmosphere are valued by their adherence to requirements from any one of a multitude of different standards bodies, many of which are themselves private organisations that may not have the resources or motivation to ensure that the carbon tokens they issue guarantee the levels and permanency of the carbon sequestration credited[79]. The poor governance and lack of uniformity threatens to squander much of the financial resources and climate change mitigation opportunities available at a time when the global community can least afford it. A centralised authority that sets carbon sequestration standards and authorises transactions could make payments to carbon sequestration projects using carbon currency. The authority's monetary mechanism would balance the levels of both carbon emissions and carbon drawdown when setting the allocation budget for each period.

In addition to the benefits of better governance for carbon drawdown projects, paying for such projects in carbon tokens solves several major issues. Firstly the carbon token market sets the carbon token price, obviating the need for bureaucratic involvement in price-setting. When the national carbon budget is reduced by the central carbon bank for instance when accelerated decarbonisation is required, the higher value of the carbon tokens paid to carbon drawdown projects would encourage more activity and therefore more carbon drawdown. Secondly, the funding of all carbon drawdown by the central carbon bank circumvents arguments over who would have to pay for the CO2 removal. The cost of the payments would be borne equally by all recipients of the carbon allowance, as the supply is expanded or contracted to cover carbon drawdown payments within the overall budget. Thirdly, the funding of the carbon drawdown by natural carbon sinks in ecosystems around the world would contribute not just to the funding needed to prevent deforestation and other ecosystem degradation, but also to climate justice via the strengthening of the normally disadvantaged communities living in these regions.

Complements Efficiency Measures

Public Support and Social Impact: the EcoCounts Example

Populist Backlash

Need to rewrite this from the original at Climate Works:

https://www.climateworks.org/blog/putting-people-at-the-heart-of-climate-action/

In France, the Yellow Vests movement and associated social unrest of 2018 was motivated by rising crude oil and fuel prices, and the disproportionate burden of fuel taxation (carbon tax) on working and middle classes. Ultimately, due to protests and unrest, President Emmanuel Macron abandoned the fuel tax.

In 2019, Ecuadorian President Lenin Moreno removed the 40-year-old fuel subsidy (both an austerity and fiscal climate measure), which led to a dramatic spike in the price of gas and diesel. Violent protests led by lower-income earners broke out and ultimately Moreno backed down and reversed the policy.

California’s solar rooftop net energy metering policy was, due to public pressure, recently amended because it favored affluent, predominately white residents while leading to increased costs for low-income rate payers.

In the United States, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Reform Act of 2012, which imposed major increases in insurance premiums in flood-prone areas in order to reflect the “true risk of living in high-flood areas”, and which resulted in a 10-fold increase in premiums. Impacted communities and politicians expressed concerns regarding the impact of the rate increases and as a result, Congress reformed and weakened the bill.

Freedom of Choice

One of the main problems of enacting or promising to enact laws to restrict personal behaviours is loss of popularity and elections and worse, stoking populist movements[80]. Personal carbon trading is the least worst policy option in this regard, being less draconian than outright bans. Backed by a national carbon currency, personal carbon trading would also lend a transparency and credibility to this policy that does not play into the hands of populist narratives in the same way that an opaque carbon tax would.

Fairness

Climate Justice Issues: the Just Transition

The largest-ever expert survey on the economics of climate change[46] demonstrated an overwhelming consensus that: the costs of inaction on climate change were higher than the costs of action; that immediate, aggressive emissions reductions were economically desirable; that major climate-related GDP losses and a reduction in long-term economic growth were likely; and that climate impacts would most likely exacerbate economic inequality both between countries and within most countries. This is in stark contrast to UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change prognoses[81].

While PCT can drive these emissions reductions through personal behaviour change, an unadapted PCT framework also has social equity issues where wealth buys the right to pollute, with the result that either the emissions reduction targets are not met or low income citizens choose to forgo simple carbon-intensive necessities. Accepted practical minimal thresholds exist for the energy consumption required to provide decent material living standards[82]. To avoid breaching these thresholds, governments implementing a national carbon currency to underpin PCT quotas would provide a 'carbon' social safety net in parallel to the government services for health and well-being.

PCT allows citizens to sell excess tokens. Inequitable distribution of CO2 emissions means average emissions are significantly above modal emissions[83]. On an initial allowance of the national average CO2 emissions, the majority of citizens would be able to sell excess allowance through PCT without impacting their lifestyle. This would represent a form of Universal Basic Income, arguably offering an array of benefits for an economy[84]. Notable UBI advocate Andrew Yang[85] ran in the US Democratic Party primaries for the 2020 American presidency on a platform popularising UBI. Direct payments to citizens and furlough schemes during the COVID-19 pandemic, made with various justifications, have strengthened the arguments for UBI[86]. In a future beset by economic upheaval from calamitous climate change and further pandemics[87], such direct payments will likely become more frequent and in some countries may be replaced through the introduction of Universal Basic Income[88].

The nature of globalised trade means that the carbon footprint of any given goods or services can be produced in several different nations around the world. In the current paradigm of CO2 emissions reduction under the Paris 2015 Climate Accord framework, each nation commits to reduce its GHG emissions by its own nationally determined amount and there is no enshrined equitability to guarantee the fair distribution of effort according to either cumulative historical emissions or exported emissions. Both of these issues play an important role in climate negotiations and resolutions to both can be implemented through the existing unused UNFCCC-compliant Contraction and Convergence framework of the Global Commons Institute[11][89], whereby national contributions could be agreed and then transparently, robustly delivered via an international carbon currency among participating nations.

The issue of international distribution of emissions reduction efforts and nationally determined contributions is a direct corollary of the principle of equal per capita access to atmospheric commons[90] and is still an open issue at negotiations under the UNFCCC. As an example of international climate justice, a parallel based on carbon taxes is described by Soergel B. et al., who make a compelling case for international redistribution of carbon tax revenues, with IAM results showing that Sustainability Development Goals 1 (eradication of extreme poverty) and SDG13 (combat climate change) must be balanced to avoid counteractions, and that the international transfer of just 5% of carbon tax revenues - USD 100 billion p.a. or 2% of GDP - to Sub-Saharan Africa would suffice[91]. As noted above though, even when equitability issues are solved, carbon taxes might be useful in the short term but lack credibility as a driver of deep decarbonisation. Perhaps the most pragmatic attempt to solve the export emissions issue[92] categorises the attempts to calculate national carbon footprints as either consumption-based emissions accounting (to burden the importer) or production-based emissions accounting (to burden the exporter) and proposes a mixed accounting method. The use of an international carbon currency for accounting purposes would obviate the need for this dichotomy between consumption-based and production-based accounting.

Figures

Key Actors and Institutional Requirements

A central carbon bank would be established, similar in function to a central bank, mandated by the government to achieve CO2 emissions reduction targets via the allocation of a carbon allowance to citizens. It would administer the public carbon tokens market where citizens and business come to sell their surplus or obtain more. It would also process the payment, audit and verification of tokens from the carbon producers. The quantity of surrendered carbon tokens would be audited to validate the amount of fossil fuel production.

Central banks across the globe are already putting in place the framework for an international digital reserve currency or Central Bank Digital Currencies[93]. This could be duplicated for the purposes of carbon currency.

The tokens would be subject to decay via a negative interest rate on the carbon token accounts, so the central carbon authority would also monitor, manage and report on the carbon credit supply in the economy - the quantity of tokens held by citizens and businesses in their accounts. This information would feed back into the decision-making process for calculating the optimal quantity of tokens to allocate at the start of each rationing period.

The other key actors in the framework are the carbon producers. Every gas well, oil well and coal mine operation would be subject to upstream metering by the carbon authority to measure the quantity of fossil fuels extracted and audit the payment of tokens by the carbon producer to the carbon bank.

Compliance and policing of the whole system would take place at the level of the carbon producers via audit of received tokens at the ends of supply chains.

Downstream companies in the petrochemical industry and beyond in wider industry which do not extract fossil fuels would, by definition of this framework, not be subject to metering or payment of carbon tokens to the carbon authority - they would pay carbon tokens to the end producers for the purchase of fossil fuels at the desired point in the supply chain.


Operational Impact: An Example Supply Chain incorporating the Carbon Currency Framework

If a citizen wished to purchase a television, for instance, the carbon currency would flow through the supply chain as follows, resulting in the carbon producer (the oil, gas or coal extraction company) becoming the key audit point for carbon supply control. For simplicity's sake, we imagine that the UK has implemented the framework unilaterally.

  1. The national carbon authority will use the predetermined annual, monthly, weekly or daily carbon budget to allocate all UK citizens an equal payment of carbon currency (carbon tokens), denominated in absolute tonnes, kilos and grams of CO2.
  2. The customer chooses a TV, considering both the price and the carbon tokens required against the features wanted, and paying both money and carbon tokens in one transaction. The TV retailer decides what the carbon token payment should be.
  3. The TV retailer receives the money and the carbon tokens from the customer, e.g. 500kg for the television in this example.
  4. The TV retailer purchases the TV from the TV manufacturer, in a similar transaction of money and carbon tokens.
  5. The retailer would demand a slightly higher carbon token payment from its customers than it pays for the goods, because it has to keep its shop warm in winter, pay to transport the televisions and cover other everyday carbon expenses.
  6. The TV manufacturer builds the TV from components, e.g. a plastic casing and a flat screen.
  7. The flat screen for the sake of this example comes from China who are not yet in the system.
  8. The carbon authority works closely with the UK customs authority to impose the framework on all incoming goods and services from countries not in the system, acting as proxy for international trade partners by taking or making carbon payments. The UK customs authority estimates how much carbon was emitted in the making of the flat screen, and levies this amount on import. Delivery to the TV manufacturer only occurs on payment of the carbon tokens.
  9. The plastic casing is made in the UK and has its own £ price and carbon token cost, which the plastic manufacturer demands from the TV manufacturer. The plastic manufacturer uses considerable energy making the case, and bases the carbon token cost for each plastic case produced on (a) the carbon tokens paid to the factory's energy provider and (b) the carbon tokens paid for the petrochemicals it converted into plastic.
  10. The energy provider could be using gas or coal or wind or nuclear, but in this example uses North Sea gas. It buys the gas wholesale from a carbon producer and pays the £ price and a tonne of carbon tokens per tonne of North Sea gas bought (or more if the carbon producer expends energy supplying the gas).
  11. At the end of the rationing period under audit, the carbon producer must pay the carbon authority a tonne of carbon tokens for every tonne of carbon pumped out of its North Sea gas fields.
  12. If any actor in the process runs out of carbon tokens for whatever reason, they would have to purchase the extra carbon tokens on the open carbon market, which is regulated by the carbon authority, but whose price level is set by supply and demand in the market.

Unused References

[94] [95] [96] [97]

Financial income from fossil fuels is the main driver of climate delay and denial. People - Upton Sinclair said, it’s difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it.. Nations - neither Norway nor Canada has seriously entertained restricting current production. These outcomes can be attributed to continued public support for fossil fuel–driven prosperity; institutions that assign responsibility for production and climate to different government agencies; and the success of counternarratives that unilateral supply restrictions are futile, prosperity from petroleum exports will fund domestic clean-energy transitions, and gas exports advance global climate action.[98]

The Commons - we can change our economic system so that the commons are not a tragedy. Management attempts to date[99]

References

  1. ↑ Black R., Cullen K., Fay B. et al.: Taking Stock: A Global Assessment of Net Zero Targets Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit and Oxford Net Zero (2021)
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Griscom B.W., Adams J., Ellis P.W. et al.: Natural climate solutions PNAS 114.44 pp11645-11650 (2017)
  3. ↑ Waring B., Neumann M., Prentice I.C. et al.: Forests and Decarbonization – Roles of Natural and Planted Forests Front. For. Glob. Change (2020)
  4. ↑ Lecina-Diaz J., Martínez-Vilalta J., Alvarez A. et al: Characterizing forest vulnerability and risk to climate-change hazards Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 19.2 (2021)
  5. ↑ Lagomasino D., Fatoyinbo T., Castañeda-Moya E. et al.: Storm surge and ponding explain mangrove dieback in southwest Florida following Hurricane Irma Nat Commun 12, 4003 (2021)
  6. ↑ Kenner D., Heede R.: White knights, or horsemen of the apocalypse? Prospects for Big Oil to align emissions with a 1.5 °C pathway Energy Research & Social Science, p.102049 (2021)
  7. ↑ Abdulla A., Hanna R., Schell K.R. et al: Explaining scarbon tokenessful and failed investments in U.S. carbon capture and storage using empirical and expert assessments Environmental Research Letters 16 014036 (2020)
  8. ↑ Hanna R., Abdulla A., Xu Y. et al.: Emergency deployment of direct air capture as a response to the climate crisis. Nature Communications 12, 368 (2021)
  9. ↑ Grant N., Hawkes A., Mittal S. et al.: Confronting mitigation deterrence in low-carbon scenarios Environ. Res. Lett. 16.064099 (2021)
  10. ↑ Climate Change Committee: The Sixth Carbon Budget: The UK's Path to Net Zero United Kingdom Climate Change Committee Advisory Report on Period 2033-2037 (2020)
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Meyer A.: The Kyoto Protocol and the emergence of “contraction and convergence” as a framework for an international political solution to greenhouse gas emissions abatement Man-made climate change. Physica, Heidelberg pp291-345 (1999)
  12. ↑ Fleming D.: Energy and the Common Purpose: Descending the Energy Staircase with Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs) The Lean Economy Connection (Fleming Policy Centre) (2005)
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Fawcett T. and Parag Y.: Editorial: An introduction to personal carbon trading Climate Policy 10.4 329–338 (2010)
  14. ↑ Chen D.B., van der Beek J., Cloud J.: Climate mitigation policy as a system solution: addressing the risk cost of carbon Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment 7.3 233-274 (2017)
  15. ↑ Bernard J.T., Kichian M.: The Impact of a Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax on GDP Dynamics: The Case of British Columbia. Energy Journal 42.3 (2021)
  16. ↑ Bruvoll A., Larsen B.M.: Greenhouse gas emissions in Norway: do carbon taxes work? Elsevier Energy Policy 32.4 493-505 (2003)
  17. ↑ Andersson J.J.: Carbon Taxes and CO2 Emissions: Sweden as a Case Study American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11(4) 1-30 (2019)
  18. ↑ Pretis F.: Does a Carbon Tax Reduce CO2 Emissions? Evidence From British Columbia SSRN (2019)
  19. ↑ Cushing L., Blaustein-Rejto D., Wander M. et al: Carbon trading, co-pollutants, and environmental equity: evidence from California’s cap-and-trade program (2011–2015) PLoS Medicine (2018)
  20. ↑ Markham F., Young M., Reis A. et al: Does carbon pricing reduce air travel? Evidence from the Australian ‘Clean Energy Future’ policy, July 2012 to June 2014 Journal of Transport Geography 70 pp 206-214 (2018)
  21. ↑ Tvinnereim E., Mehling M.: Carbon pricing and deep decarbonisation. Energy Policy 121 pp185-189 (2018)
  22. ↑ Boyce J.K.: Carbon pricing and climate justice. The Routledge Handbook of the Political Economy of the Environment. Routledge 243-257 (2021)
  23. ↑ Mildenberger M., Lachapelle E., Harrison K. et al: Limited impacts of carbon tax rebate programmes on public support for carbon pricing Nature Climate Change 12 141–147 (2022)
  24. ↑ Elkins P., Baker T.: Carbon Taxes and Carbon Emissions Trading Journal of economic surveys 15.3 325-376 (2001)
  25. ↑ Sandbag: An agenda for strategic reform of the ETS. What’s the future for EU carbon pricing? Ember-Sandbag Report (2017)
  26. ↑ Badgley G., Freeman J., Hamman J.J. et al: Systematic over-crediting in California's forest carbon offsets program bioRxiv (2021)
  27. ↑ Just S.: The carbon price thaw: Post freeze future of GB carbon price Aurora Energy Research (2017)
  28. ↑ Jenkins J.: Why carbon pricing falls short. Kleinman Center for Energy Policy Report (2019)
  29. ↑ Lilliestam J., Patt A., Bersalli G.: The effect of carbon pricing on technological change for full energy decarbonization: A review of empirical ex‐post evidence WIREs Climate Change 12,1 (2020)
  30. ↑ Mann M.E.: The New Climate War: the fight to take back our planet. Public Affairs Hachette Book Group, New York (2021)
  31. ↑ Brulle R.J., Aronczyk M., Carmichael J.: Corporate promotion and climate change: an analysis of key variables affecting advertising spending by major oil corporations, 1986–2015. Climatic Change 159 87–101 (2020)
  32. ↑ Center for Climate and Energy Solutions: Regulating Power Sector Carbon Emissions Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (2020)
  33. ↑ World Bank: State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2020. Washington, DC: World Bank (2020)
  34. ↑ An K., Zhang S. et al: Socioeconomic impacts of household participation in emission trading scheme: A Computable General Equilibrium-based case study. Applied Energy 288 116647 (2021)
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 Parag Y. and Fawcett T.: Personal carbon trading: a review of research evidence and real-world experience of a radical idea. Energy and Emission Control Technologies 2:23-32 (2014)
  36. ↑ Ivanova D., Barrett J., Wiedenhofer D. et al.: Quantifying the potential for climate change mitigation of consumption options Environmental Research Letters 15 093001 (2020)
  37. ↑ Schultz P.W. et al: The constructive, destructive, and reconstructive power of social norms. Psychol Sci. 18(5):429–434 (2007)
  38. ↑ Hügel S., Davies A.R.: Public participation, engagement, and climate change adaptation: A review of the research literature. WIREs Clim Change 11:e645. (2020)
  39. ↑ 39.0 39.1 Hadley L.: Removing Barriers To Environmental Action: The Impact Of Personal Cap-And-Trade Systems On Individuals' Sense Of Efficacy And Personal Responsibility For Climate Change. University Of Northern British Columbia, Doctoral Dissertation (2020)
  40. ↑ Kuppalli K., Brett-Major D.M., Smith T.C.: COVID-19 Vaccine Acceptance: We Need to Start Now. Open Forum Infectious Diseases (2021)
  41. ↑ Ratzan S.C., Payne J.G., Massett H.A.: Effective health message design: The America Responds to AIDS campaign. American Behavioral Scientist 38 no. 2 pp294-309 (1994)
  42. ↑ Roodhouse M.: Rationing returns: a solution to global warming? History and Policy, Kings College London (2007)
  43. ↑ 43.0 43.1 Keen S.: The appallingly bad neoclassical economics of climate change Globalizations 1-29 (2020)
  44. ↑ 44.0 44.1 Bastien-Olvera B.A., Moore F.C.: Use and non-use value of nature and the social cost of carbon. Nature Sustainability 4 101–108 (2020)
  45. ↑ Stern N., Stiglitz J.E.: The Social Cost of Carbon, Risk, Distribution, Market Failures: An Alternative Approach. National Bureau of Economic Research No. w28472 (2021)
  46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 Institute for Policy Integrity: Gauging Economic Consensus on Climate Change Institute for Policy Integrity (2021)
  47. ↑ Nordhaus W. D.: To slow or not to slow: The economics of the greenhouse effect The Economic Journal, 101(407), 920–937. (1991)
  48. ↑ Keen S.: Economic failures of the IPCC process pp161–182 in: Williams, S.J., Taylor, R. (eds): Sustainability and the New Economics Springer, Cham. (2022)
  49. ↑ Keen S., Lenton T.M., Garrett T.J. et al.: Estimates of economic and environmental damages from tipping points cannot be reconciled with the scientific literature Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119.21 e2117308119 (2022)
  50. ↑ Greer S.L. et al.: The comparative politics of COVID-19: The need to understand government responses. Global Public Health 15.9: 1413-1416 (2020)
  51. ↑ Bloomberg News: U.S. Climate Envoy Kerry Warns Glasgow Is Last Chance for Action Bloomberg online (2021)
  52. ↑ Vaughan A.: David Attenborough on Climate Change New Scientist 3238 (2019)
  53. ↑ Lee M.: The Advent of Decimalisation in Britain: 1971. Historian 106 p20 (2010)
  54. ↑ Keen M., Lockwood B.: The value added tax: Its causes and consequences. Journal of Development Economics 92(2) pp.138-151 (2010)
  55. ↑ Velkar A.: “Imperial Folly”: Metrication, Euroskepticism, and Popular Politics in Britain, 1965–1980. Journal of Modern History 92(3):561-601 (2020)
  56. ↑ Burda M., Gerlach S.: Exchange rate dynamics and currency unification: The Ostmark-DM rate. Empirical Economics 18 417–429 (1993)
  57. ↑ Leblond P.: Completing the Maastricht Contract: institutional handicraft and the transition to European Monetary Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 42(3):553-72 (2004)
  58. ↑ Quiggin J.: The Y2K scare: Causes, costs and cures. Australian Journal of Public Administration 64(3):46-55 (2005)
  59. ↑ van den Bergh J.C.J.M., Castro J., Drews S. et al: Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy. Climate Policy, pp.1-20 (2021)
  60. ↑ Nerini F.F., Fawcett T., Parag Y. et al: Personal carbon allowances revisited Nature Sustainability (2021)
  61. ↑ Bothner F. Personal Carbon Trading—Lost in the Policy Primeval Soup? Sustainability 13.8 4592 (2021)
  62. ↑ Moore F.C., Diaz D.B.: Temperature impacts on economic growth warrant stringent mitigation policy. Nature Climate Change 5 127-131 (2015)
  63. ↑ Laffoley D., Baxter J.M., Amon D.J. et al: Eight urgent, fundamental and simultaneous steps needed to restore ocean health, and the consequences for humanity and the planet of inaction or delay Aquatic Conservation 30.1 pp. 194-208 (2020)
  64. ↑ Raux C., Croissant Y. and Pons D.: Would personal carbon trading reduce travel emissions more effectively than a carbon tax?. Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 35:72-83 (2015)
  65. ↑ Sun X. and Zhenhua W.: Can Chinese Families Achieve a Low-Carbon Lifestyle? An Empirical Test of China’s Low-Carbon Pilot Policy Frontiers in Energy Research 9 pp113 (2021)
  66. ↑ Woerdman E. and Bolderdijk J. W.: Emissions trading for households? A behavioral law and economics perspective Eur. J. Law Econ. 44 pp553–578 (2017)
  67. ↑ Van der Cam A., Van den Broeck G., Adant I.: Designing an end-user carbon account scheme as a climate policy tool in the EU context Faculté des bioingénieurs, Université catholique de Louvain (2021)
  68. ↑ House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee: Personal Carbon Trading UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2008)
  69. ↑ Calame P.: Petit traité d'œconomie ECLM (2018)
  70. ↑ Statista, Ember: UK-ETS carbon pricing 2023 Statista website (2023)
  71. ↑ Defra UK: Measuring UK greenhouse gas emissions UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs website (2021)
  72. ↑ du Plessis M.: The role of knowledge management in innovation Journal of Knowledge Management 11.4 20-29 (2007)
  73. ↑ Tennison I., Roschnik S. et al: Health care's response to climate change: a carbon footprint assessment of the NHS in England. The Lancet Planetary Health, 5(2), pp.e84-e92 (2021)
  74. ↑ Giles C.: Next Generation Compliance: Environmental Regulation for the Modern Era. Oxford University Press, NY (2020)
  75. ↑ Financial Times: Aluminium companies complain about EU carbon border tax loophole Financial Times 9th July 2023 (2023)
  76. ↑ Climate Home News: Pacific “mixed feelings” after compromise on shipping’s climate goals Climate Home News 7th July 2023 (2023)
  77. ↑ Rogelj J., Shindell D., Jiang K. et al: Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Global warming of 1.5°C 2:93-174 (2018)
  78. ↑ Schwartzman S.S., Lubowski R.N., Pacala S.W. et al: Environmental integrity of emissions reductions depends on scale and systemic changes, not sector of origin Environ. Res. Lett. 16 091001 (2021)
  79. ↑ Turner G., Grocott H., Maslin M. et al: The Global Voluntary Carbon Market – Dealing with the problem of historic credits Trove Research Report (2020)
  80. ↑ Lockwood M.: Right-wing populism and the climate change agenda: exploring the linkages Environmental Politics 27.4 pp712-732 (2018)
  81. ↑ Field C.B., Barros V.R., Mach K.J. et al: IPCC, 2014: Climate change 2014: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: Global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press (2014)
  82. ↑ Millward-Hopkins J., Steinberger J.K., Rao N.D. et al.: Providing decent living with minimum energy: A global scenario Global Environmental Change 1;65:102168 (2020)
  83. ↑ Chancel L.: Global Carbon Inequality, 1990-2019: The Impact of Wealth Concentration on the Distribution of World Emissions Nature Sustainability 5 pp931–938 (2022)
  84. ↑ Hoynes H., Rothstein J.: Universal basic income in the United States and advanced countries. Annual Review of Economics 11: 929-958 (2019)
  85. ↑ Yang A.: The war on normal people: The truth about America's disappearing jobs and why universal basic income is our future. Hachette (2018)
  86. ↑ Holder S.: 2021 Will Be the Year of Guaranteed Income Experiments Bloomberg Citylab (2021)
  87. ↑ Gillespie T.R. et al: COVID‐Clarity demands unification of health and environmental policy. Global Change Biology (2021)
  88. ↑ Hensher M.: Covid-19, unemployment, and health: time for deeper solutions? British Medical Journal 371 m3687 (2020)
  89. ↑ Maslin M.A.: The road from Rio to Glasgow: a short history of the climate change negotiations Scottish Geographical Journal 136.1-4 pp5-12 (2020)
  90. ↑ Hickel J.: Quantifying national responsibility for climate breakdown: an equality-based attribution approach for carbon dioxide emissions in excess of the planetary boundary. Lancet Planetary Health 4.9 e399-e404 (2020)
  91. ↑ Soergel B., Kriegler E., Bodirsky B.L. et al.: Combining ambitious climate policies with efforts to eradicate poverty Nature Communications 12.2342 (2021)
  92. ↑ Jakob M., Ward H. and Steckel J.C.: Sharing responsibility for trade-related emissions based on economic benefits Global Environmental Change 66:102207 (2021)
  93. ↑ Bank for International Settlements: Impending Arrival – A Sequel to the Survey on Central Bank Digital Currency BIS Paper No. 107 (2020)
  94. ↑ Franta B.: Early oil industry disinformation on global warming. Environmental Politics 1-6 (2021)
  95. ↑ Gillett N.P., Kirchmeier-Young M., Ribes A. et al.: Constraining human contributions to observed warming since the pre-industrial period. Nature Climate Change (2021)
  96. ↑ IPCC: IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C IPCC (2018)
  97. ↑ Lempert R. et al.: Characterizing climate-change uncertainties for decision-makers Climatic Change 65.1-2: 1-9 (2004)
  98. ↑ Harrison K., Bang G.: Supply-Side Climate Policies in Major Oil-Producing Countries: Norway’s and Canada’s Struggles to Align Climate Leadership with Fossil Fuel Extraction Global Environmental Politics 22 (4): 129–150 (2022)
  99. ↑ Nellinger L.: An unexpected discovery: Johann Heinrich von Thuenen and the tragedy of the commons ZBW Econstor (2014)
Retrieved from ‘https://wiki.ecocounts.community/w/index.php?title=Academic_References_for_Carbon_Accounts&oldid=429’